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Abstract— We consider the random graph induced by the
random key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and
Gligor under the assumption of full visibility. We show
the existence of a zero-one law for the absence of isolated
nodes, and complement it by a Poisson convergence for
the number of isolated nodes. Leveraging earlier results
and analogies with Erd̋os-Renyi graphs, we explore similar
results for the property of graph connectivity. Implications
for secure connectivity are discussed.
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I. I NTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are distributed collections
of sensors with limited capabilities for computations and
wireless communications. It is envisionned that such networks
will be deployed in hostile environments where communica-
tions are monitored, and nodes are subject to capture and
surreptitious use by an adversary. Under such circumstances,
cryptographic protection will be needed to ensure secure
communications, as well as sensor-capture detection, key revo-
cation and sensor disabling. However, traditional key exchange
and distribution protocols based on trusting third partiesare
inadequate for large-scale WSNs, e.g., see [7, 15, 17] for
discussions of some of the challenges.
A. A random key predistribution scheme
Recently Eschenauer and Gligor [7] have proposed a key
management solution better suited to WSN environments. Thi
scheme, hereafter called the EG scheme, is based onrandom
key predistribution and operates in three phases: Considera
collection ofn sensor nodes equipped with wireless transmit-
ters, and assume available a large set ofP cryptographic keys,
also known as thekey pool.
(i) Initialization phase: Before network deployment, each node
randomly selects a set ofK distinct keys from the pool. These
This report is an extended version of the submission [18]. Some f the
notation has been changed and embarassing mistaken have been caught!
K keys form thekey ring of the node, and are inserted into its
memory. Key rings are selected independently across nodes.
(ii) Key setup phase: After deployment, each node discovers its
wireless neighbors, i.e., nodes which are within its wireless
communication range. When a node finds a wireless neighbor
with whom it shares a key, they mutually authenticate the key
to verify that the other party actually owns it. At the end of
this phase, wireless neighbors which have keys in common can
now communicate securely with each other in one hop.
(iii) Path-key identification phase: The key rings being randomly
selected, there is a possibility that some pairs of wireless
neighbors may not share a key. If a path made up of nodes
sharing keys pairwise exists between such a pair of wireless
neighbors, this (secure) path can be used to exchange apath-
key to establish a direct (and secure) link between them.
B. Dimensioning for secure connectivity
A basic question concerning the EG scheme is its ability
to achievesecure connectivity among participating nodes in
the sense that asecure path exists between any pair of nodes.
Given the randomness involved, for any pair of integersP
and K such thatK < P , there is a positive probability that
secure connectivity willnot be achieved – This will be so
even in the best of cases when the communication graph is
itself connected.1 Hence, there arises the need to understand
how to select the parametersP and K in order to make the
probability of secure connectivity as large as possible.
This issue was addressed by Eschenauer and Gligor in their
original paper under two simplifying assumptions, namelyfu l
visibility andmutual independence of secure link allocations;
more on this second assumption in Section III. Full visibility
refers to the situation where two nodes are always able to
communicate with each other, irrespective of their relative
positions or the quality of the wireless links that may exist
between them. In that case, the shared key discovery process
allows every pair of nodes to determine whether their key
rings have keys in common. This makes it possible to model
1The communication graph refers to the graph induced by the communica-
tion process whereby two nodes are adjacent if they are wireless neighbors,
e.g., the disk model or the SINR graph.
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the EG scheme by the random graphK(n; P, K), introduced
in Section II and hereafter referred to as therandom key graph.
For sure, the assumption of full visibility does away with the
wireless nature of the communication infrastructure supporting
WSNs. However, in return this simplification allows us to
focus on how randomizing key selections affects the establih-
ment of secure links. It is this aspect of the EG scheme that we
study here, as we develop various properties for the random
key graph. We do so with an eye towards understanding how
proper parameter selection in the EG scheme may lead to
secure connectivity with very high probability.
C. Contributions
For the class of random key graphs, we show the existence
of a zero-one law for the absence of isolated nodes, and
identify the corresponding critical thresholds; see Theorem
4.1. We complement this result by a Poisson convergence
for the number of isolated nodes; see Theorem 4.4. These
results already imply a zero law for the property of graph
connectivity. Next, starting with earlier results by Di Pietro et
al. [4], we leverage analogies with Erdős-Renyi graphs (and
attending zero-one laws) to conjecture the form of zero-one
laws for graph connectivity in random key graphs. We also
give conditions for the corresponding “double exponential”
result. Implications of these issues for secure connectivity can
be found in Section III. The proofs for Theorems 4.1 and 4.4
are outlined in Sections V and X, respectively.
All the rvs under consideration are defined on thesame
probability triple(Ω,F , P). For sequencesa, b : N0 → R+, we





II. RANDOM KEY GRAPHS
The model is parametrized by three positive integers,
namely the numbern of nodes, the sizeP of the key pool
and the sizeK of each key ring withK < P . To lighten
the notation we often group the integersP and K into the
ordered pairθ ≡ (P, K). With P the set of cryptographic
keys, letPK to denote the collection of all subsets ofP which







For each nodei = 1, . . . , n, let Ki(θ) denote the random
set of K distinct keys assigned to nodei. We can think of
Ki(θ) as anPK-valued rv. Under the EG scheme, the rvs
K1(θ), . . . ,Kn(θ) are assumed to bei.i.d. rvs which are
uniformly distributed overPK with





, S ∈ PK (1)
for all i = 1, . . . , n. This corresponds to selecting keys
randomly andwithout replacement from the key pool.
The key set-up phase in the EG scheme suggests a natural
notion of adjacency between nodes: Distinct nodesi, j =
1, . . . , n are said to be adjacent if they share at least one key
in their key rings, namely
Ki(θ) ∩ Kj(θ) 6= ∅. (2)
In that case, an undirected link is assigned between nodesi and
j. The resulting graph with vertex set{1, . . . , n} is hereafter
denotedK(n; θ). For distinct i, j = 1, . . . , n, it is a simple
matter to check that











Random key graphs form a subclass in the family of random
graphs known in the literature asrandom intersection graphs,
e.g., see [12, 16]. The model discussed here differs from the
class of random graphs in these references where each node is
assigned a key ring, one key at a time according to a Bernoulli-
like mechanism (so that a key ring has a positive probability
of being empty).
Despite strong similarities, we stress that the random graph
K(n; θ) is not an Erdős-Renyi graphG(n; p) [11] even if we
use
p = 1 − q(θ). (5)
This is so because edge assignments are correlated inK(n; θ)
but independent inG(n; p): Indeed, define the edge assignment
rvs as the indicators rvs given by
ξij(θ) := 1 [Ki(θ) ∩ Kj(θ) 6= ∅]
for distinct i, j = 1, . . . , n. Then, for distinct tripletsi, j, k =
1, . . . , n, the rvsξij(θ), ξjk(θ) and ξik(θ) are not mutually
independent (although they arepairwise independent). For
instance, it is easy to check that
P [ξij(θ) = 0, ξik(θ) = 0] = P [ξij(θ) = 0] P [ξik(θ) = 0]
but
P [ξij(θ) = 0, ξjk(θ) = 0, ξik(θ) = 0]
6= P [ξij(θ) = 0]P [ξjk(θ) = 0] P [ξik(θ) = 0] .
Let P ⋆(n; θ) denote the probability that the random graph
K(n; θ) is connected, namely
P ⋆(n; θ) := P [K(n; θ) is connected] .
In the full visibility case assumed here,P ⋆(n; θ) coincides
with the probability of secure connectivity mentioned earlier.
III. R ELATED WORK
We wish to selectP and K so thatP ⋆(n; θ) is as large
(i.e., as close to one) as possible. This issue naturally draws
attention to zero-one laws for graph connectivity in random
key graphs whenP and K are appropriately scaled withn.
Such zero-one laws are known to hold for Erdős-Renyi graphs





for somec > 0, it holds that
lim
n→∞




0 if 0 < c < 1
1 if 1 < c.
(7)
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However, given that such zero-one laws for random key
graphs were not available to them, Eschenauer and Gligor
instead replacedK(n; θ) with the proxy Erdős-Renyi graph
G(n; p) where p is given by (5), thereby leading to the
approximation
P ⋆(n; θ) ≃ P [G(n; 1 − q(θ)) is connected] . (8)
An additional benefit of this approach lies in the availability of
the celebrated “double exponential” result of Erdős and Renyi
[2, 6]: For every scalarγ, it is well known that
lim
n→∞









, n = 2, 3, . . . (10)
Thus, if we selectP and K as functions ofn, say Pn and
Kn, so that






, n = 2, 3, . . . (11)
then a reasonable approximation in the form
P ⋆(n; θn) ≃ e
−e−γ
suggests itself for largen. A refinement of this approach, still
based on the theory of Erdős-Renyi graphs, is given by Hwang
and Kim [10] for the EG as well as for a number of other
random key predistribution schemes, including schemes by
Chan et al. [3] and by Du et al. [5].
In [4], Di Pietro et al. argue that edge assignments in the
random key graph (2) are not mutually independent (as was
already indicated earlier) but may in fact be strongly correlated
for reasonable values of the parametersK andP . Therefore,
an analysis based on Erdős-Renyi graphs may not provide
a reliable guide for properly dimensioning the EG scheme.
This prompted these authors to investigate the connectivity
properties of random key graphs (without the independence
assumption on edge assignment). They showed [4, Thm. 4.6]
that forn large, the random key graph will be connected with
very high probability ifPn andKn are selected such that







as soon asc > 16.
IV. T HE RESULTS
What happens whenc ≤ 16? – This is where we pick up
the trail: Ideally, for reasons that should be apparent from
the discussion of Section III, one would like to establish a
zero-one law for graph connectivity in random key graphs,
together with the appropriate version of an attending “double
exponential” result. In view of the results of Di Pietro et al.,
we expect such a zero-one law to hold in the form
lim
n→∞




0 if 0 < c < 1









for somec > 0 (possibly with some additional conditions).
This is not too farfetched for the following reasons: First of
all, the results in [4, Thm. 4.6] already confirm the one-law
in the rangec > 16. Next, although it is certainly true that
random key graphs do not coincide with Erdős-Renyi graphs,
they certainly appear to be somewhat related – In both cases
the edge assignments are pairwise independent. Therefore,the
zero-one law (6)-(7) for Erdős-Renyi graphs may be viewed
as indirect additional support for the validity of (13) under
(14). In fact, such a “transfer” is not without precedent: Inthe
class of random intersection graphs studied by Singer et al.
[12, 16], Fill et al. [8] have shown equivalence with Erdős-
Renyi graphs in a strong sense for some asymptotic regime of
interest.
In the present paper we report on results that further suggest
the validity of (13) under (14). As with Erdős-Renyi graphs,
we address the problem by considering the property that the
random key graphK(n; θ) contains no isolated nodes. Thus,
we define
P (n; θ) := P [Kn(θ) contains no isolated nodes] .
Obviously, if the random key graphK(n; θ) is connected, then
it does not contain isolated nodes, whence
P ⋆(n; θ) ≤ P (n; θ). (15)
A. Zero-one laws
With any pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N, we associate a




log n + αn
n





− log n, n = 1, 2, . . .
A pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N is said to beadmissible if
Kn < Pn for all n = 1, 2, . . .. Our main result is the following
zero-one law for the absence of isolated nodes.
Theorem 4.1: For any admissible pair of functionsP, K :
N0 → N, it holds that
lim
n→∞




0 if limn→∞ αn = −∞
1 if limn→∞ αn = +∞
(17)
where the functionα : N0 → R is determined through (16).
A proof of Theorem 4.1 is outlined in Section V. Theorem
4.1 readily implies the following zero-one law.
Corollary 4.2: Consider an admissible pair of functions








0 if 0 < c < 1
1 if 1 < c.
(18)
Indeed, it suffices to use Theorem 4.1 with any admissible
pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N whose functionα : N0 → R
satisfies
αn = (c − 1) (1 + o(1)) · log n, n = 1, 2, . . .
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P ⋆(n; θn) = 0 if 0 < c < 1. (19)
This already establishes the zero-law in (13) under (14). In
fact, Theorem 4.1 already implies the stronger statement
lim
n→∞
P ⋆(n; θn) = 0 if limn→∞ αn = −∞.
Taking our cue from existing results for Erdős-Renyi graphs
[2, 6, 11] (as well as for geometric random graphs, e.g.,
see [9, 14]), we expect that again for random key graphs,
graph connectivity and the absence of isolated nodes are
asymptotically equivalent graph properties (for largen). This
leads to the following conjecture which is currently under
investigation:
Conjecture 4.3: For any admissible pair of functionsP, K :
N0 → N, it holds that
lim
n→∞




0 if limn→∞ αn = −∞
1 if limn→∞ αn = +∞
(20)
with functionα : N0 → R determined through (16).
As before, by virtue of (15), the zero-law in Conjecture 4.3
readily follows from Theorem 4.1.
B. Poisson convergence
Stronger results can be contemplated: Considerθ = (P, K)
with positive integersK and P such thatK < P . Fix n =
2, 3, . . . and write
χn,i(θ) := 1 [Node i is isolated in Kn(θ)] , i = 1, . . . , n






The random graphKn(θ) has no isolated nodes ifIn(θ) = 0,
in which case
P (n; θ) = P [In(θ) = 0] . (21)
Let Π(µ) denote a Poisson rv with parameterµ. Using the
Stein-Chen method we obtain a Poisson approximation result
which yields convergence to a Poisson rv.
Theorem 4.4: Consider an admissible pair of functions




αn = γ (22)
for some scalarγ. Then, we have the convergence
In(θn) =⇒n Π(e
−γ) (23)
with =⇒n denoting convergence in distribution (withn going
to infinity).
The attending “double exponential” result is now immediate
from (21), and takes the form
lim
n→∞
P (n; θn) = e
−e−γ (24)
for any admissible pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N satisfying
the assumptions of Theorem 4.4. This result readily implies
Theorem 4.1 by an easy monotonicity argument.
Finally, the conjectured asymptotic equivalence of graph
connectivity and absence of isolated nodes, which underlies




P ⋆(n; θn) = e
−e−γ
under the assumptions required for (24) to hold.
V. A PROOF OFTHEOREM 4.1
Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and considerθ = (P, K) with positive
integersK and P such thatK < P . The equivalence (21)
provides the basis for proving Theorem 4.1 by means of the
method of first and second moments [11, p. 55]. This approach
relies on the well-known bounds
1 − E [In(θ)] ≤ P [In(θ) = 0] (25)
and








We proceed by evaluating these bounds: The rvs
χn,1(θ), . . . , χn,n(θ) being exchangeable, we find







= nE [χn,1(θ)] (28)
+ n(n − 1)E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]

























The proof of Theorem 4.1 passes through the next two
technical lemmas which are established in Sections VII and
VIII, respectively.








0 if limn→∞ αn = +∞
∞ if limn→∞ αn = −∞
(30)
where the functionα : N0 → R is determined through (16).






2 = 1 (31)




αn = −∞. (32)
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To complete the proof of Theorem 4.1, pick a pair of functions
P, K : N0 → N with functionα : N0 → R determined through
(16). For eachn = 1, 2, . . ., we conclude from (25) and (26)
that
1 − E [In(θn)] ≤ P [In(θn) = 0] (33)
and








Letting n go to infinity in (33) under the assumption
limn→∞ αn = ∞, we getlimn→∞ P (n; θn) = 1 from Lemma
5.1.
Next, let n go to infinity in (34) under the condition (32):
Lemma 5.1 already yieldslimn→∞ E [In(θn)] = ∞, while










The conclusionlimn→∞ P (n; θn) = 0 is now immediate.
This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.
VI. SOME EASY PRELIMINARIES
In this section we have collected for easy reference several
technical facts that will be used repeatedly in the discussion.
A. A useful decomposition
With 0 ≤ x < 1, it is a simple matter to check that





dt = −x − Ψ(x) (35)
















while the decomposition (35) and the non-negativity ofΨ lead
to the standard bound
1 − x ≤ e−x, x ∈ [0, 1]. (37)
B. Simple consequences of the condition (32)
Pick a pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N with function
α : N0 → R determined through (16). Under condition (32),
we haveαn < 0 for n sufficiently large, in which caseαn =


































= 0, c ≥ 0. (41)
By virtue of (40), we note that for eachc > 0, we have
Pn > cKn for all n sufficiently large.







































C. An easy technical fact
The next technical fact will help simplify the discussion in
a number of places.
Lemma 6.1: Consider an pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N
such that the functionα : N0 → R determined through (16)


















Proof. Fix c ≥ 0 and recall (36) and (41). For eachn =

































































and (42) readily implies (43).





























































(1 + o(1)). (48)
Let n go to infinity in (46): Making use of (47) and (48) we
readily get (44) from the limits (38) and (42).
D. Factorials and bounds















(P − K)(P − K − 1) . . . (P − 2K + 1)
































are now immediate from the inequalitiesP −K < P −ℓ ≤ P ,
ℓ = 0, . . . , K − 1.
VII. A PROOF OFLEMMA 5.1
Considerθ = (P, K) with positive integersK andP such
that 2K < P and fix n = 2, 3, . . .. Under the enforced
independence assumptions, it is a simple matter to see that
E [χn,i(θ)] = q(θ)
n−1 (51)
for all i = 1, . . . , n, whence
E [In(θ)] = nq(θ)
n−1. (52)
Next substitute in this expressionθ by θn by means of an
admissible pair of functionsP, K : N0 → N. First we deal





for all n = 1, 2, . . . with
α′n := log n − (n − 1)
K2n
Pn
= log n −
(n − 1)
n








We havelimn→∞ α′n = −∞ wheneverlimn→∞ αn = ∞,
whence limn→∞ nq(θn)n−1 = 0. The conclusion
limn→∞ E [In(θn)] = 0 is now reached upon invoking (52).









for all n = 1, 2, . . .. We find it convenient to write the left



































as we use the decomposition (35) in the second equality. The
first two terms in (55) combine as
log n − n
K2n
Pn − Kn















































(1 + o(1)) .
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Letting n go to infinity in (55), we conclude from (56)
and (57) thatlimn→∞ α′′n = − limn→∞ αn = ∞ since
limn→∞ αn = −∞. It is now plain from (53) and (54) that
limn→∞ E [In(θn)] = ∞ by virtue of (52).
VIII. A PROOF OFLEMMA 5.2
Considerθ = (P, K) with positive integersK andP such










Fix n = 2, 3, . . .. Under the enforced independence assump-
tions, it is a simple matter to check that
E [χn,i(θ)χn,j(θ)] = q(θ)b(θ)
n−2















































































Under the condition (32) we show below that
lim
n→∞





n−2 = 1. (61)







and the desired result (31) follows from (58).
In order to establish (60) and (61) we proceed as in the













for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Letting n go to infinity and making use
of (44) (with c = 0 andc = 1) we get (60).





























≤ r(θn) ≤ 1. (65)
It is now plain that the convergence (61) will be established
if we can show that
lim
n→∞








To that end, for eachn = 2, 3, . . . we note that






























































Applying Lemma 6.1 (withc = 0 andc = 2) yields
lim
n→∞
























The convergence (66) now follows.
IX. CALCULATIONS
The proof of Theorem 4.4 will make use of the calculations
presented in this section:
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Lemma 9.1: Consider an admissible pair of functions
P, K : N0 → N whose functionα : N0 → R satisfies (22)









= e−γ . (67)
Under the assumptions of Lemma 9.1 we note the following:




log n + |γ| + ε
n
(68)














Proof. Fix n = 1, 2, 3, . . . and c = 0, 1. The decomposition
(35) gives






= −(n − 1)
K2n
Pn − cKn

























We now inspect each term in turn: First,









= log n −
n − 1
n





























































and we conclude that
lim
n→∞
An = −γ. (73)
Next, we deal with the second factor in (70): For eachn =
1, 2, . . ., we have
































= −(n − 1)
K3n
2P 2n
(1 + o(1)) (74)















and it is now immediate that
lim
n→∞
Bn = 0. (76)
Finally, let n go to infinity in (70). We get (67) upon
collecting (73) and (76).
Lemma 9.1 has the following useful consequences: For each










log n + βn
n
(77)








, n = 1, 2, . . .
Invoking (72) and (75) we get thatlimn→∞ βn = γ since
limn→∞ αn = γ. Applying Lemma 9.1 (withPn replaced by
Pn − Kn) readily leads to the conclusion
X. A PROOF OFTHEOREM 4.4
By a coupling argument the rvsχn,1(θ), . . . , χn,n(θ) can be
shown to benegatively related (in the technical sense given in
[1, p. Defn. 2.1.1, p. 24]). As a result, the basic Stein-Chen
inequality [1, Cor. 2.C.2, p. 26] takes on the simpler form
dTV (In(θ); Π(E [In(θ)])) ≤
E [In(θ)] − Var[In(θ)]
E [In(θ)]
(78)
wheredTV denotes the total variation distance. The triangular
inequality for the total variation distance yields
dTV (In(θ); Π(e
−γ)) ≤ dTV (In(θ); Π(E [In(θ)])) (79)
+ dTV (Π(E [In(θ)]); Π(e
−γ))
We study each of the terms in turn.
First, the estimate
dTV (Π(E [In(θ)]); Π(e
−γ)) ≤ |E [In(θ)] − e
−γ | (80)
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is well known [13, p. 58]. Next, direct substitution from (27)
and (28) gives
E [In(θ)] − Var[In(θ)]











2 − n(n − 1)E [χn,1(θ)χn,2(θ)]
whence
E [In(θ)] − Var[In(θ)]
E [In(θ)]

























upon making use of the expressions (51) and (58).
Finally, substituteθ by θn by means of an admissible pair
of functionsP, K : N0 → N whose functionα : N0 → R


















by making use of Lemma 9.1. Next, with the help of (64), we


















































= e−γ , (84)
Collecting (81) and (84) we find
lim
n→∞
E [In(θn)] − Var[In(θn)]
E [In(θn)]
= 0. (85)










[1] A. D. Barbour, L. Holst and S. Janson,Poisson Approximation,Oxford
Studies in Probability2, Oxford University Press, Oxford (UK), 1992.
[2] B. Bollobás,Random Graphs, Cambridge University Press, New York,
2001.
[3] H. Chen, A. Perrig and D. Song, “Random key predistribution schemes
for sensor networks,” in Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on
Security and Privacy (SP 2003).
[4] R. Di Pietro, L.V. Mancini, A. Mei, A. Panconesi and J. Radh krish-
nan, “Sensor networks that are provably secure,” in Proceedings of
SecureComm 2006, the 2nd IEEE/CreateNet International Confere ce
on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, Baltimore (MD),
August 2006.
[5] W. Du, J. Deng, Y.S. Han and P.K. Varshney, “A pairwise keypre-
distribution scheme for wireless sensor networks,” in Proceedings of
Conference on Computer and Communication Security ( 2004),
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[12] M.K. Karoński, E.R. Schneinerman, and Karen B. Singer-Cohen, “On
random intersection graphs: The subgraph problem,”Combinatorics,
Probability and Computing8 (1999), pp. 131-159.
[13] T. Lindvall, Lectures on the Coupling Method, John Wiley & Sons, New
York (NY), 1992.
[14] M.D. Penrose,Random Geometric Graphs, Oxford Studies in
[15] A. Perrig, J. Stankovic and D. Wagner, “Security in wireless sensor
networks,”Communications of the ACM47 (2004), pp. 53–57.
[16] K.B. Singer,Random Intersection Graphs, Ph.D. Thesis, Department of
Mathematical Sciences, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore (MD),
1995.
[17] D.-M. Sun and B. He, “Review of key management mechanisms in
wireless sensor networks,”Acta Automatica Sinica12 (2006), pp. 900-
906.
[18] O. Yagan and A.M. Makowski, “On the random graph inducedby
a random key predistribution scheme under full visibility,” Submitted
for inclusion in the program of the IEEE International Symposium on
Information Theory (ISIT 2008), Toronto (Canada), July 2008.
